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THE PASSING OF NONSECTARIANISM-
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE SCHOOL PRAYER CASE
Robert E. Rodes, Jr.*
In the hearts of many Americans there recurs a wistful hope that
somehow reasonable men can agree on a common denominator of
religion detached from its manifestations in any organized church.
History is not encouraging to them.
-Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr.
Engel v. Vitale' seems to constitute the end of the road for the attempt
to formulate an American national religious commitment in "nonsectarian"
terms for purposes of dissemination in the public schools. There remain only
a few remnants of the traditional practice of Bible reading- which we may
expect to be disposed of by the Supreme Court this term2 - and the words
"under God" in the Flag Salute - which may hold a precarious position under
the protection of the doctrine of de minimis, unless Justice Douglas can persuade
his brethren to repudiate that doctrine.'
This denouement, if tragic, seems inevitable. Each successive change in
* Associate' Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. Member of the Massachusetts
and Indiana Bars; A.B., Brown, 1947, LT-B., Harvard, 1952.
1 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
2 School District v. Schempp, 201 F. Supp. 815 (E.D. Pa. 1962), prob. juris. noted,
31 U.S. L. WEEK 3116 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1962); Murray v. Curlett, 228 Md. 239, 179 A.2d
698 (1962), cert. granted, 31 U.S.L. WE=K 3116 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1962).
3 Douglas' opinion in Engel seems to rest on the view that religious activities under
government auspices are to be regarded as financially supported by government. Why the
doctrine of de minimis does not make this ground unavailing is difficult to see, and Douglas
does nothing to enlighten us. De minimis has also been advanced against the majority
opinion in Engel; see, e.g., Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 HARv. L. REv.
25 (1962); but here it does not seem as apposite. Black's attack on the practice complained
of seems to regard it as a moral, not as a financial, support of religion, in which capacity
it cannot fairly be regarded as trifling.
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the religious make-up of our population has brought with it a controversy,
often long and acrimonious, over religion in the public schools, and has ended
in something being characterized as sectarian which had been considered non-
sectarian before.' The history has been set forth often enough,' and there is
no need to take it up in detail here. Now, we find that the process has advanced
so far that there remains among our traditional forms of religious expression
not one so trivial as to meet the test of nonsectarianism, so that the school
authorities must needs set out to compose a new one.
Here, they run afoul of a venerable principle indeed. They are doing
what the English Parliaments and Convocations did when they set up the
original "establishment of religion" in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries;
they are devising a religious observance calculated to take up the varying
religious commitments of the citizens into a single national observance expressing
the unity of the national community before God.
The majority opinion, striking down the practice for this reason, disposes at
least implicitly of the distinction that the prayer adopted by the school authorities
is supplementary to, rather than in lieu of, other forms of religious observance.
This, says Mr. Justice Black, would be relevant if the "free exercise" clause
were in issue, but not where the case invokes the "no establishment" clause.
The distinction most strenuously urged by the proponents of the practice, how-
ever, was that the prayer they had composed was "nondenominational." In
other words, it is nonsense to say that what is nonsectarian is itself a sect. Black
for the majority does not take the obvious way out of pointing to someone for
whom the practice is unacceptable on religious lines, and thereby showing
that the attempt to be nonsectarian has failed. In fact, Black does not meet
the nondenominational argument at all. In assuming, however, that the prayer
4 CREMIN, THE AMERICAN COMMON SCHOOL 197 (1951), quotes an editorial out-
burst that-sets the tone of the controversy over nonsectarianism as it has taken shape for
different protagonists in different generations. The occasion is the successful campaign of
Horace Mann during the late '30's and early '40's of the nineteenth century to exclude
from the nonsectarian content of public school instruction material that favored "orthodox"
Protestantism over the various forms of "liberal" Protestantism (notably, Unitarianism)
that were growing up in the period. The editorialist is an Episcopalian:
Universalism, Millerism, Mormonism, and other "comeoutisms," have
sprung up since, and must the liberality of our fathers be interpreted,
so as to give place to heresies, which concern 'the very vitals of Chris-
tianity? Presently the papist will give us his interpretation of the word
"sectarian," as he does in the "Catholic Herald," to the Philadelphians,
"Catholics only ask liberty of Conscience. The Bible may be read in the
schools; provided Catholics be not forced to read a sectarian version."
No; readers - give not to every individual schismatic, comeouter, and
infidel, unlimited use of the word "sectarian." They will employ it to
rob you of the gospel of Jesus Christ, the good news, that "we who were
afar off, alienated from God by wicked works, are made nigh by the blood
of Christ."
Generally speaking, Mann's version of nonsectarianism, the version attacked in the above
quotation, consisted of the King James Bible. The response of the papists to this version
was just what the editorial predicted, and the controversy they stirred up by their position
was if anything more vigorous than that stirred up by Mann. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND
FREEDOM, 374-79 (1953) [hereinafter cited as PFEFFER]. In recent years, comparable diffi-
culties have been raised by Jews over the celebration of Christian holy days in the schools.
Id. at 399-408.
5 For the early history, up to 1850, see CREMIN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 181-218.
PFEFFER at 274-90, 374-83 has succinct treatments of the more important aspects, taken
down to the present time.
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composed by the New York Regents constitutes "one particular form of religion"'
he seems to be suggesting not only that this prayer cannot be considered non-
sectarian, but that no other prayer can be.
If, then, as both reason and authority would seem to indicate, nonsectarian-
ism must go,' what are we offered to take its place in our national life generally,
and our public schools in particular? Thus far, two alternatives have presented
themselves- secularism and religious pluralism. Secularism is a confinement
of the values endorsed by the state- and hence by the public school- to
those having to do with this world, or those not having to do with God.8 It
commends itself to those who hold no religion, to those whose religion is not
much concerned with a corporate expression in the social order, and to those
who suppose that their own particular religion will be overlooked when the
others are being accommodated by the state. Prominent in the last category
are certain Jewish groups ably represented by Mr. Leo Pfeffer, for whom
nonsectarianism is Christianity and religious pluralism is antisemitism.' ° The
6 370 U.S. at 431.
7 Sutherland, supra note 3, seems to see some hope for the continued vitality of non-
sectarianism in an attenuated form either not inconsistent with Engel or protected by the
doctrine of de minimis against the application of Engel. Pfeffer, on the other hand, seems
to regard Engel as a complete victory for the uncompromising position he has long been
urging. Court, Constitution and Prayer, 17 RUTGERS L. Rnv. - (1963). However the
situation may work out in practice, it seems doubtful that the survivals of nonsectarianism
will be sufficient to satisfy the aspirations of its proponents. Sutherland, supra at 50-51,
describes a number of attempts to revive the principle of nonsectarianism by constitutional
amendment. He does not seem to take them very seriously, and the prospect of the adoption
of any of them seems remote.
8 Pfeffer, supra note 7, gives a lucid account of the doctrine which he earlier elaborated
in more detail in his book, CHURCH, STATE AND FREEDOM. He holds:
the first amendment, which merely makes explicit what is implicit in
the Constitution itself, requires government in the United States to be
secular. Its ends must be exclusively secular, and in achieving them, it
may use only secular means.
In making his case for this position, he does not address himself to the possibility that gov-
ernment may pursue religious, or at least supernatural, ends by secular means - a possi-
bility that seems implicit in his great stress on the value for religion itself of the strictly
secular approach he advocates.
9 PFEFFER 395:
The courts that have held the Bible to be nonsectarian have had no
difficulty in so holding the Lord's Prayer [citing Doremus v. Board of Edu-
cation, 5 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d 880 (1950)]. Aside from the differences be-
tween the Protestant and Catholic versions of the Lord's Prayer, it would
seem that characterizing the Lord's Prayer as nonsectarian constitutes a
cavalier disregard of the conviction of adherents of the Jewish faith.
As far as is known, no recognized Jewish religious authority agrees with
that characterization. The prayer itself is preceded by the injunction -
hardly acceptable to pious Jews whose religion requires them to pray
in synagogues - that: "And when thou prayest, thou shalt not be as the
hypocrites are: for they love to pray standing in the synagogues and in
the corners of the streets, that they may be seen of men (Matthew 6:5)."
Even more important, designating as the "Lord" any human being vio-
lates a basic article of Jewish faith.
See also Id. at 399-408 on the singing of Christmas carols.
10 Id. at 357, quoting from an affidavit taken in connection with the proceedings in
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952):
Following the introduction of released time at P.S. 163, Brooklyn, I be-
gan to notice that I was ostracized by the other children in after-school
activities. I was not permitted to share in their play and they made un-
flattering remarks about my not going to the church center because I was
Jewish. As a result of arguments about my non-participation in released
time, my classmates called me such names as "Christ killer" and "dirty
Jew."
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position of Mr. Pfeffer and his followers is entitled to a good deal of respect;
much bitter experience has gone into its formation."
Secularism has powerful opponents who feel - despite the pious disclaimer
of Mr. Justice Black 2 -that the inevitable outcome is an active godlessness
as offensive to the believer as religious observance would be to the agnostic."
Thus far, however, they have not been able to match Pfeffer's concrete examples
of outrages to the individual conscience. 4
Religious pluralism, the other alternative, is the solution that developed
on the Continent of Europe out of the seventeenth-century stalemate between
Protestant and Catholic forces." It conceives of a division of society into
separate religious "communities," each of which is recognized by the state as
representing its adherents in all matters religious or related to religion. To
the extent that this system prevails, the state, if it wishes to venture into the
field of education, must do so through the school systems of the different religious
communities. This conception of religious pluralism formed the basis for the
plan of religious instruction invalidated in the McCollum case,' 6 and furnishes
the rationale for most of those who seek state support for parochial schools.
Quite apart from the support it lends to projects such as these, religious
pluralism has a certain affinity for prevailing concepts of Catholic ecclesiology
that the other alternatives lack; this has led Catholics to favor it from the outset.
This tendency has been reinforced by the experience of Catholicism on the
Continent of Europe, where pluralistic arrangements have been the only peace-
ful forms of adjustment between Catholics and non-Catholics living in the
11 In addition to the material cited supra notes 9 and 10, see Id. at 344-45, 337-38,
356-67, 399-408, and passim. If I lay great stress on this aspect of Pfeffer's teaching - per-
haps more than he himself would do - it is because I find it the most persuasive aspect.
12 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 433-35 (1962).
13 PFEFFER at 301-02 compiles a number of cogent statements to this effect. The theory
has been further elaborated recently by a line of Catholic argumentation to the effect that
there are in America four basic faiths, Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism, and Secularism,
and that a policy of religious neutrality forbids government to favor Secularism just as it
forbids government to favor any of the other three faiths. See Whalen, Secularism, the Fourth
Faith, Our Sunday Visitor, Nov. 11, 1962, Magazine Section, p. 1. This seems to suggest
that the advocates of secularism as a political and juridical approach to church-state prob-
lems are motivated by a personal conviction that man's salvation is to be looked for in this
world. In fact, there is no evidence that more than a handful of them are so motivated.
14 It does not stand to reason that a man's conscience is violated by listening to some-
thing he considers superficial as it would be by listening to something he disagrees with. As
atheism and agnosticism are somewhat lacking in musical and ceremonial expression, it is
difficult to invent a hypothetical situation that would impose on believers in general the
indignities of which Pfeffer complains; PFEFFER 399-408. Perhaps a pageant representing
Nietzsche announcing to a group of local goatherds that God is dead, with a little Catho-
lic boy chosen to play the part of Nietzsche would present an appropriate analogy. To
pursue the matter a little farther, is it conceivable that if the objections of Catholics to the
secularized public schools extended - as do those of certain Amish groups - to the point
of holding it a matter of conscience not to attend them under any circumstances, some
mitigation of the secularist position would not be forthcoming? See my Religious Educa-
tion and the Historical Method of Constitutional Construction, 9 RUTGERS L. Rav. 682,
688-92 (1955). In fact, there is no major religious denomination, however much it would
prefer denominational schools, that will refuse to send children to public schools if its own
denominational schools are not available.
15 The German, Dutch and Belgian solutions, as described in PFEFFER 50-52 are typical.
16 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
REFLECTIONS ON THE SCHOOL PRAYER CASE
same society. By the same token, the opposition to pluralistic solutions has
never been free from anti-Catholic bias. 7
The only full-fledged pluralistic approach we have had in this country,
however, was not under Catholic auspices at all, but was an intermediate stage
in the liquidation of the Massachusetts Congregational establishment - a liqui-
dation completed before the time of the great Catholic immigrations."8 The
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 had made a general provision for the raising
of funds by local government for the teaching of religion, subject to a provision
allowing any taxpayer to have his own taxes directed to the support of teachers
of his own denomination "provided there be any on whose instructions he
attends; otherwise it may be paid toward the support of the teacher or teachers
of the parish or precinct in which the said moneys are raised."' 9
This arrangement, besides being limited in its benefits to Protestants,
20
contained a number of loopholes attributable to the inherent incapacity of
legislative foresight to keep up with the proliferation of American religious
bodies.2 ' It seems likely that despair, of the possibility of being fair to everyone
contributed as much as anything else to the abandonment of a pluralistic
establishment in Massachusetts and other states that took their lead from her.
Significantly enough, this event took place just before the flood of Catholic
immigration presented the American school authorities with the Catholic
demand for pluralistic support of education.
In general, then, experience has shown that a system of pluralistic support
is extremely difficult of operation in a fully open society. The pluralistic societies
of Europe are characterized by a small number of recognized groups, and a
splinter group has as much difficulty in tapping the sources of public support
as it would in a state with a single established religion.22 Pfeffer's description
of the problems of educating Jewish children in the pluralistic system of Quebec
Province provides a telling example close to home.23 It is also significant that
the advocates of pluralism in our country have begun by oversimplifying our
religious make-up into the familiar Protestant-Catholic-Jew triad.24 In the
system of pluralistic religious instruction stricken down in McCollum, both
the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Lutherans had attempted to set up programs
separate from the general Protestant program, and had not been allowed to
do so.25
But the most important ground of opposition to pluralistic structures,
particularly in education, has been the "divisiveness" inherent in them.26 The
17 For early examples, see the Nast cartoons reproduced in 2 STOKES, CHURCH AND
STATE IN THE UNITED STATES figs. 32-35 (1950) [hereinafter cited as STOxEs]. Paul Blan-
chard, of course, presents a well-known contemporary example. AMERICAN FREEDOM AND
CATHOLIC POWER 286 and passim (1949).
18 1 STORES 418-27.
19 MASS. CONST. art. III (1780).
20 Ibid.
21 E.g., Barnes v. First Parish, 6 Mass. 401 (1810).
22 See, e.g., PILGERT, THE WEST GERMAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM 43-44 (1953).
23 PFEFFER 43-45.
24 HERBERG, PROTESTANT- CATHOLIC-J w 53-54 (1955) [hereinafter cited as
HERBERO].
25 PFEFFER 347.
26 PFEFFER at 437 summarizes the arguments that have been made along these lines in
recent years.
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aspiration to unity which was felt by our society from the beginning was regarded
as inconsistent with a breakdown into rigorously defined and cohesive groups
-a view which seems to have a good deal of merit when we consider the
European model to which the advocates of pluralism look. It is this aspiration
to unity that seems to have been uppermost in the minds of the Common
Council of New York in 1841, when they rejected the Catholics' first major
bid for state support of their parochial schools:
However much we may lament the consequences, we are not dis-
posed to question the right of our Catholic fellow citizens to keep
their children separated from intercourse with other children, but
we do not think the Common Council would be justified in
facilitating such an object .... 27
This continues to be the theme of some of the most vigorous opposition to
pluralistic solutions, particularly in the schools.28
The national unity to which we thus aspire, relied on by the dominant
forces in our country to assimilate the immigrant and attach him to our insti-
tutions, 29 relied on by the immigrant to secure him a place in the national life
that his group membership cannot command," is yet by no means encompassed
within these practical objects. National unity has affinities for the Christian
understanding of human brotherhood, and the Founding Fathers were not
unaware of those affinities. Madison, writing in 1785 against a proposed pluralis-
tic establishment in Virginia that would have required every citizen to contribute
to the support of the church of his choice, points out that "The very appearance
of the Bill has transformed that 'Christian forbearance, love and charity' which
of late mutually prevailed into animosities and jealousies which may not soon
be appeased."'" This religious understanding of national unity has a historical
basis to which we shall turn in a moment.
Meanwhile, let us note that it is unfair to suggest, as Black does,32 and
many others before him,"3 that the desire for public recognition of religion
betrays a lack of confidence on the part of the religionist that his principles
can prevail on their own merits. Rather, it is a desire to see expressed in
appropriate symbols a profound conviction about our society-that the free,
democratic, and fraternal society to which we are committed as a people is
rooted in a religious commitment;34 that equality and brotherhood as we adhere
to them are rooted in the equality and brotherhood of all men before the
judgment seat of God.
Judged by this standard, the alternatives of pluralism and secularism are
open to the same objection. They conceive of the common bond uniting the
citizens of our society as relating only to their secular concerns, and therefore,
for any religiously committed person, as superficial. This is not the tradition
27 Quoted in CREMIN, Op. cit. supra note 4, at 168. (Emphasis in original.)
28 See, e.g., THAYER, RELIGION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 125-51 (1947).
29 CREMIN, op. cit. supra note 4, at 44-47.
30 Id. at 33-44.
31 MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS, quoted
at PFE FER 100.
32 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
33 E.g., MADISON, Op. cit. supra note 31.
34 GABRIEL, THE COURSE oF AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT 14-19, 26-38 (1940)
[hereinafter cited as GABRIEL].
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we have received from the fathers of our republic, and, through them, from
the ancient and undivided Christendom of the West. It is my purpose to
explore the historical origins and present consequences of what I consider the
authentic tradition, and its embodiment in the forms of nonsectarianism, and
then to shed what light I can on the possible sources of a form of corporate
expression to replace the now repudiated nonsectarian form without abandoning
the tradition.
II~s
The conception of social unity characteristic of medieval Christendom
came through the Reformation more nearly intact in England than in any
other major nation of Europe, because only in England did a commitment to
such a conception of unity succeed in dominating both of the competing reli-
gious commitments. This peculiar state of affairs in England is attributable to
a political and intellectual force that dominated the English Commons from
the fourteenth century on, and passed into the centuries after the Reformation
under the name of Erastianism e It can perhaps best be described as medieval
35 The first part of this section is based on material I have gathered for a study of the legal
history of the Anglican Establishment. Pending the appearance of this study, I would like to
record here a first installment on my thanks to the Ford Foundation for the grant that made this
research possible.
36 For the continuity of this tradition in English ecclesiology, compare the preamble to the
Statute of Provisors of 1350, 25 Edw. 3, 6, language first adopted in Parliament in 1306, 1 Rot.
Parl. 319a:
Whereas the holy church of England was founded in the estate of prelacy
by the king and his progenitors, and the earls, barons, and other nobles of
his said realm, and their ancestors, to inform them and the people of the law
of God, and to make hospitalities, alms, and other works of charity ....
with the preamble to the Act for the Restraint of Appeals, 1532, 24 Hen. 8, c. 12:
Where by divers sundry old authentick histories and chronicles, it is mani-
festly declared and expressed, that this realm of England is an empire . . .
governed by one supreme head and King . . . (2) unto whom a body poli-
tick, compact of all sorts and degrees of people, divided in terms, and by
names of spiritualty and temporalty, been bounden and owen to bear, next
to God, a natural and humble obedience; .. . (4) the body spiritual whereof
having power, when any cause of the law divine happened to come in ques-
tion, or of spiritual learning, then it was declared, interpreted, and shewed
by that part of the said body politick, called the spiritualty, now being usual-
ly called the English church, which always hath been reputed, and also
found of that sort, that both for knowledge, integrity and sufficiency of num-
ber, it hath been always thought, and is also at this hour, sufficient and meet
of itself, without the inter-meddling of any exterior person or persons, to de-
clare and determine all such doubts, and to administer all such offices and
duties, as to their rooms, spiritual doth appertain; (5) for the due adminis-
tration whereof, and to keep them from corruption and sinister affection, the
King's most noble progenitors, and the antecessors of the nobles of this realm,
have sufficiently endowed the said church, both with honour and possessions;
(6) and the laws temporal . . . was and yet is administered, adjudged and
executed by sundry judges and ministers of the other part of the said body
politick, called the temporalty; (7) and both their authorities and jurisdic-
tions do conjoin together in the due administration of justice, the one to help
the other.
Further, compare both of these with the general position'of a middle-of-the-road Restoration
divine such as Stillingfieet, who admits certain powers to inhere in a Christian ministry (A
Discourse Concerning the Power of Excommunication in a Christian Church, 2 WoRKs (1709)),
but regards the particular institutional structure of the church as taking its origin from social
convention (Irenicum, 2 WORKS), and in England from law (3 WORKS 742-61; A Vindica-
tion of their Majesties Authority to Fill the Sees of the Deprived Bishops, 3 'WoRKS 959).
Finally, compare thfe position of a relatively modem jurist, LEwis T. DIBDIN, CHURCH COURTS
(1881), who holds that it is the business of the church to formulate its doctrine and of the
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lay conservatism. This conservatism is characterized by an earnest (though
perhaps not devout) commitment to Christianity and to the medieval under-
standing of a Christian society; at the same time, it is nationalist, resentful of
clerical domination and still more so of clerical corruption, and resentful of.
the papacy as the embodiment of all the other objects of its disapproval."
The religious commitment that characterizes this lay conservatism, while
very real, does not extend to theological niceties, indeed, insofar as these niceties
are the concern of the mistrusted clerical class, it tends to be impatient with
them.3" Rather, its primary concern is with a practical Christianity, expressed
in the traditional institutional forms of medieval Christendom, and guarded
against clerical corruption and encroachments by the power of organized
society embodied in the person of the King.
The attributes of the English Establishment of the Church, as they emerge
from the period of uncertainty following the Reformation, conformed to this
lay conservative tradition, despite pressures from theological commitments on
both sides. We may sum up these attributes as follows:
1. The state is committed to a conception of national unity derived from
the medieval understanding of Christendom, and defined in terms of
a religious consensus. This defining consensus is intended to transcend
as far as possible the divergencies in the theological opinions enter-
tained by the citizens.39
2. This religious consensus is to be embodied in a single institutional and
state to enforce it. I am not sure Dibdin would admit to being an Erastian, but his opponents
would certainly call him one, and, in my opinion, with good reason. See GEORGE, THE PROTES-
TANT MIND OF THE ENGLISH REFORMATION 181-210 (1961). The authors discern the same
continuity I do in the tradition, although they are not willing to use the term "Erastianism"
to describe it. This is because they regard the term as referring to a subordination of the
Church to the secular purposes of the state, whereas I define it with reference to the tradition
described in text.
37 These concerns appear over and over again in the Parliament Rolls, especially in the
petitions of the Commons against papal provisions. Their greatest pre-Reformation statement,
however, is probably in the works of Christopher St. Germain, a lawyer, evidently orthodox in
his theology, who writes just at the time of Henry VIII's proceedings against the papacy. See
especially A TREATYSE CONCERNING THE POWER OF THE CLERGYE AND THE LAWES OF THE
REALME (no date).
38 Instructive in this regard is the attitude toward the theological controversies of the time
taken by Bernard Gilpin, a country parson whose ministry began in Edward VI's time, and
extended through Mary's to Elizabeth's. He shares with George Herbert the status of unofficial
patron saint of the Anglican parish clergy, having become a distinguished man through his high
pastoral zeal. He is impatient with the proliferation of doctrinal formulas as impeding the
serious business of carrying on the ministry. CARLETON, THE LIFE OF MR. BERNARD GILPIN
(London 1629). Cf., LACEY, THE REFORMATION AND THE PEOPLE (1929).
39 That the authoritative doctrinal formularies of the Church of England were adopted to
this end is rather a commonplace among those who address themselves to the subject. See, e.g.,
TOTTLE, A CHARGE RELATIVE TO THE ARTICLES (1772). That is, these formularies are held
not to be magisterial, as teaching doctrine to the faithful, but juridical, as setting the limits of
accommodation among the divergent opinions in the way good legislation on other subjects sets
the limits of accommodation among the competing interests in society. This approach is ap-
parent in the opinion of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the famous case of
Gorham v. Bishop of Exeter (1850). This decision does not appear in any set of reports, having
been printed in a separate volume by the then current reporter of Privy Council decisions. It is
adequately described for our purposes in NL~s, GORHAM AND THE BISHOP OF EXETER 96-104
(1951). A comparison of the opinion with that of the lower court (which it reversed), 2 Rob.
Eccl. 1, 163 Eng. Rep. 1221 (Arches 1849), will bring the approach into sharper relief. In my
opinion, despite the resulting outcry, it is the Judicial Committee and not the Dean of the
Arches that represents the authentic Anglican tradition.
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liturgical form,"' so drawn up as to be acceptable to all forms of
theological opinion included within the national consensus.41
3. Those who accept the national consensus, but not the institutional
and liturgical form in which it is embodied, are to be compromised
with as much as possible through amending the forms in question.4 2
To the extent they are irreconcilable, some abortive attempts at coercion
are made, but ultimately toleration is hit upon as the proper solution.'
4. Those whose dissent is not from the form, but from the consensus
itself, are to be proceeded against, not as heretics, but as enemies of
the social order." The persecution of Roman Catholics was ration-
alized along these lines,"5 as was that of Quakers.46 There was a
certain tendency under Charles I to regard Protestant dissenters in
the same light,"7 but their status as dissenters from the form only,
rather than from the underlying consensus, was solidly established in
the course of the Restoration period.4" Later, similar concessions were
gradually extended to other religious groups.4 9
The Church of England was not entirely content with the role thus imposed
upon it, and much of its history during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
involves its attempt to recover its freedom of action, either by imposing further
commitments upon the nation 0 or by escaping its role of embodying the
national consensus." These attempts need not concern us except to the extent
of noting that they were by and large unsuccessful. The church-state relation
in England was, and to a certain extent continues to be, governed by the four
principles just set forth.
Due to the prominent role of English Protestant dissenters in the settlement
of America, Establishment in the English sense did not gain a firm foothold
on this side of the Atlantic. By the time the federal constitution was adopted,
40 The fullest statement of this view seems to be DAVIS, DE JuRE UNIFORMITATE ECCLESIAZ
(1669).
41 Martin v. Machonochie, 5 Moore (NS) 500, 16 Eng. Rep. 603 (P.C. 1868), sets forth
what is in my opinion the authentic Anglican tradition in this regard. See NEALE, ELIZABETH
I AND HER PARLIAMENTS 52-84 (1953).
42 SYKES, FROM! SHELDON TO SECKER ch. 3 (1959); JASPER, PRAYER BOOK REVISION IN
ENGLAND 1800-1900 ch. 1 (1954).
43 SYKEs, op. cit. supra note 42. It is noteworthy that the first Act of Toleration, 1 Wm.
& Mary, c. 18 (1688), required a dissenting minister to subscribe all the Anglican Articles of
Religion except those dealing with institutional and liturgical form.
44 JORDAN, DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIOUS TOLERATION IN ENGLAND (1932-1940).
45 3 HUGHES, THE REFORMATION IN ENGLAND 335-96 (1954).
46 The Quakers were not persecuted as such, but their conscientious refusal to take oaths
or pay tithes brought them under the penalties of general laws. See TILLOTSON, THE LAWFUL-
NESS AND OBLIGATION OF OATHS (1681), quoted in ANGLICANISM 672-73 (More and Cross
ed. 1951); 1 BURN, ECCLESIASTICAL LAW 517-26 (1763); BoHUN, THE LAW OF TITHES 444-
45 (3d ed. 1744).
47 E.g., R. v. Bastwick, Burton and Prynne, 13 St. Trials 711 (1637).
48 ANONYMOUS, A LETTER FROM A JUSTICE OF THE PEACE TO A COUNSELLOR AT LAW
CONCERNING CONVENTICLES WITH THE COUNSELLOR'S REPLY, Bodleian Pamph. C. 148 (15)
(no date- evidently written after the Restoration and before the Act of Toleration).
49 ADDISON, RELIGIOUS EQUALITY IN MODERN ENGLAND (1944).
50 See, e.g., Jenkins v. Cook, 1 P.D. 80 (P.C. 1876); Banister v. Thompson, [1908] P.
362 (Arches), prohibition denied sub nom. R. v. Dibdin, [1910] P. 57 (K.B.D. and C.A.
1909), aff'd sub noma. Thompson v. Dibdin, [1912] A. C. 533 (H.L.).
51 EVERY, THE HIGH CHURCH PARTY, 1688-1718 ch. 8 (1956); Shipley, Church and
State, Chambers, Decay of Discipline, Wood, Ecclesiastical Suits, all in ECCLESIASTICAL
REFORM (Shipley ed. 1873).
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such attempts as had been made in the direction of established churches had
almost all given way to a principle of equality, at least among Protestant de-
nominations.52 On the other hand, most of the religious influences that went
into the original make-up of American society were all represented in the English
national consensus, albeit not in the same proportions. The only exceptions
were the Quakers in Pennsylvania and the Roman Catholics in Maryland, and
these by the time of the Revolution had been reduced to about the same
positions they had in the other colonies and in the mother country. 3 Thus,
the defining consensus of English society could be carried over into American
society without significant alteration. The major groups that had come to
America to avoid religious persecution were able to regard their troubles in
England as occasioned solely by the existence of an officially established insti-
tutional and liturgical form they could not accept."4
This pragmatic experience of the nature of religious controversy, reinforced
by certain trends in Protestant ecclesiology too complex to be gone into here,
led to a general feeling that the harmony of the civil state would be adequately
secured if it were to extricate itself from the differences between the alternative
institutional and liturgical forms of religion - called sects or denominations.5
This principle, after some abortive experiments already discussed with religious
pluralism, worked itself out with almost universal acceptance in terms of the
prevailing nonsectarianism. The federal government was committed to this
nonsectarian approach from the outset, and all the states had followed suit by
the middle of the nineteenth century. 6
The American system of nonsectarianism, then, is the English system of
establishment stripped of its commitment to a single institutional and liturgical
form. We can describe it in terms of the following four principles, to be
compared or contrasted with the four principles governing the Establishment
in the mother country:
1. The defining consensus in American society is basically the same as
that in English society. It shares with the latter, and with the original
medieval understanding of Christendom, the aspiration to a fraternal
union among the citizens," and the conviction that certain principles
of civil government are of divine origin. The understanding of what
these principles are departs from the English model, due to the influ-
ence of certain natural-right theories that have freer play in America
52 PFEFFER 106; 1 STOKES 358-446.
53 On the Roman Catholics, see 1 STOKES 784-87; on the Quakers, Id. at 755-57.
54 This is brought out rather well by the history of the successful resistance of the colonists
to proposals for the introduction of an Anglican bishop on this side of the Atlantic. 1 STOKES
231-40.
55 There is an exhaustive treatment of this subject in Muzzy v. Wilkins, Smith 1 (N.H.
1803), interpreting a constitutional provision that "no subordination of one sect or denomina-
tion to another shall ever be established by law." The Court held that one sect was dis-
tinguished from another not by its doctrines but by its polity-that every sect had a number
of different doctrines (Arminianism, Calvinism, Universalism and the like) current among
its followers. See also the quotations, id. at 18 n.
56 1 STOKES 358-446.
57 Cf., CREIIN, THE AMERICAN COMMON SCHOOL 33-44 (1951); DE TOcQUEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA pt. 2, bk. 2, ch. 4.
58 GABRIEL 12-25.
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than in England where the weight of tradition is heavier. But the belief
that the principles are of divine origin is the same. Concomitantly,
certain theological views have less trouble gaining admittance to the
national consensus in America than in -England, where the political
problems are more complex; especially is this true of Catholicism. 9
2. The defining consensus in American society is not to be embodied in
any particular institutional or liturgical form.6" This is the purport
of the "no-establishment" clause of the first amendment. Ultimately,
this principle was interpreted to apply equally to a multiplicity of
such forms, and the pluralistic establishments based on a contrary
interpretation were abandoned.6 Rudimentary ceremonial observances
carried out under secular auspices, and expressing the commitment of
civil society to the consensus itself, were not regarded as violating this
principle.62 The extent to which Engel v. Vitale has changed this
aspect of the doctrine is a matter for speculation.
3. The citizens are to be free to give what institutional and liturgical form
they choose to religious commitments not inconsistent with the defining
59 On the attitudes toward Catholicism during the early and middle nineteenth century,
see GABRIEL 52-66. The attempt there described to found the American consensus on
Catholicism-the work chiefly of Brownson and Hecker-was a failure. The eventual
absorption of Catholicism into the American consensus was as a denomination of Christians.
See, e.g., 1 STOICES 698-99 on Andrew Jackson's attitude. See HERBERG 175-76:
When the American hierarchy declares itself against "secularism" and
"atheistic materialism" it is received and discussed by Americans as a general
religious pronouncement rather than as a sectarian address. Fulton Sheen,
though appareled in his bishop's cassock, is followed by a vast radio
audience consisting of many non-Catholics as well as Catholics. The
Christopher movement makes the same general appeal. This new kind of
attention that the American people give to the Catholic Church does not
mean either a lessening of the tensions between Catholics and non-Catholics
(such tensions seem to have mounted in recent years) or any particular
readiness of the American people to come over to Catholicism. It merely
means that the Catholic Church is recognized as a genuinely American
religious community, speaking to the American people not in terms of a
unique treasure of revelation entrusted to it alone but in terms of those
"ideals and values" which the American feels is [sic] at the bottom of all
religion.
60 This seems to be the teaching of the crucial case of Vidal v. Girard's Executors,
43 U.S. (2 How.) 126 (1844), in which it was held that the foundation of a school from
which all ministers of religion are excluded was not contrary to the national commitment
to Christianity, since Christianity can be taught by laymen.
61 PFEFFER 133-59. The proponents of state support for religious schools have been
saying lately that government aid to religion on any basis that treats all religions alike had
been regarded as constitutional until the time of Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1
(1947). Whatever may be the merits of state support for religious schools, the historical
foundations of this assertion seem effectively demolished by Pfeffer's argument. In a sense
it may be true that the state may provide moral support for all religions alike even though
it may not provide financial support. But such moral support is rendered to religion as such,
not to individual churches as such. The distinction is brought out in the quotation from
HERBERG, supra note 59.
62 Doremus v. Board of Education, 5 N.J. 435, 75 A.2d 880 (1950), appeal dismissed,
342 U.S. 429 (1952), is about the most recent of these cases. One of the most interesting
is Hackett v. Graded School Dist., 120 Ky. 608, 87 S.W. 792 (1905), where, as in Engel, a
nonsectarian prayer was especially composed for use in school. It was a good deal longdr
than the one involved in Engel, and ended with a recital that '"These things we ask for
Christ's sake. Amen." The court, being of the opinion that the local equivalents of the
no-establishment clause were meant to exclude any connection between the state and the
institutional church, found. the fact that the prayer was not "promulgated, authorized, or
used by any sect of religionists whatever" was a point in its favor, rather than the opposite.
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consensus. This is the purport of the "free exercise" clause of the
first amendment. It corresponds to the "toleration" accorded by the
English system to dissenters-that is, to those who come within the
defining consensus, but cannot accept its embodiment in the Estab-
lished Church. 3
4. As in the English system, religious commitments inconsistent with the
defining consensus are pro tanto inconsistent with the social order.
While they may be constitutionally protected as long as they are mere
opinions, governmental interference with their overt manifestations runs
afoul of no constitutional provision on the subject of religion.0 4 This
principle has led to the rejection of constitutional claims raised by
polygamists," by advocates of "black supremacy,"6 by persons who
work on Sunday,6" and by parents who refuse to procure medical
treatment for their children,6" or to send them to school. 9 Pacifists,
except insofar as they enjoy special concessions by statute, are treated
in the same way."0
The continuity of the American system of nonsectarianism worked out
in these four principles has been somewhat obscured by the periodic redefinition
of the defining consensus it presupposes. Our national commitment was at
one time conceived of as Protestant; later it was regarded as Christian in a
sense that included Catholics as well as Protestants. Now we tend to call it
Judaeo-Christian to reflect the increasingly articulate role of Jewish citizens
in our national life. Some of us speak of our commitment, as did some of the
Founding Fathers, in theistic but not specifically Christian terms. Herberg has
63 The legal affairs of religious bodies in this country are generally dealt with in the
same manner as those of dissenting congregations in England, although the English tend
to give less credence to the determinations of the officials of the church bodies in question,
and more to the doctrines as laid down by their founders. See, e.g., Attorney General v.
Shore, 11 Sim. 591, 59 Eng. Rep. 1002 (Oh. 1843), 9 Cl. & Fin. 355, 8 Eng. Rep. 450
(H.L. 1843); Attorney General v. Clapham, 4 D.G.M. & G. 591, 43 Eng. Rep. 638 (Ch.
1855); 7-8 Vict., c. 45 (1844). Compare these with PFEFFER 241-57.
64 The usual formulation of this principle is that government may pursue bona fide
secular objectives by bona fide secular means without regard to the religious scruples of the
citizens. See, e.g., Pfeffer, supra note 7. As a matter of logical necessity, this view must
depend either on a conviction that the religious scruples to be disregarded do not accurately
reflect the will of God, or on a belief that government may pursue its secular objectives
without regard to the will of God. The latter alternative does not seem likely to commend
itself either to the general public or to the courts, or, -for that matter, to Mr. Pfeffer. To
put it another way, even if it is theoretically possible to construct a set of secular values
by philosophical constructions in which religion plays no part, we, as a people, have not
done so. Our values, even if we call them secular, are a product of our historical experience
as a religious people.
65 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). The religious presuppositions on
which this holding rests are brought out more clearly in Mormon Church v. United States,
136 U.S. 1, 49 (1890): "The organization of a community for the spread and practice of
polygamy . . . is contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which Chris-
tianity has produced in the Western world."
66 In re Ferguson, 55 Cal. 2d 663, 12 Cal. Rptr. 753, 361 P.2d 417 (1961). See discus-
sion of this case, and others involving the same group, in Church-State Survey 1960-62, 37
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 649, 716-17 (1962).
67 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
68 Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 155 A.2d 684 (1959); PFEFFER 572-77; Church-State
Survey 1960-62, 37 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 649, 712-13 (1962).
69 PFEFFER 594-97.
70 United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931); PFEFFER 504-10.
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found evidences of a belief in nothing more than belief itself.7 But in one form
or another, the American people by and large continue to aspire to a version
of national unity understood as a fraternal union among the citizens, and con-
tinue to conceive of the basic principles of their government as responsive to no
merely secular expediency, and indeed, to no merely human hope.
It is in the public expression of our defining consensus that our difficulties
have come. Clearly enough, without some form of corporate expression it would
not be in any meaningful sense a corporate consensus. It has been generally
recognized that some such expression is required. As was just pointed out,
rudimentary ceremonial observances under secular auspices, expressing our
national commitment to the consensus as such, have up to now not been
regarded as unconstitutional. Objections to such observances have been taken
under the free exercise clause insofar as participation was compulsory or non-
participation discouraged; otherwise under the no-establishment clause. In
either event, the objections have been met by the courts with two arguments.
First, the practices complained of are in aid of the social order, and, as such,
secular; thus, the objector falls within the fourth of the rules enumerated above,
and has no constitutional ground for complaint."2 Second, the objector, being
motivated by sectarian religious considerations, runs afoul of the second of
the rules enumerated-he wishes to impose a sectarian veto on the expression
of the national consensus, thereby impairing its pristine nonsectarianism.73 The
nearest the courts have come to a departure from this line of reasoning is -in
the second Flag Salute Case,4 and it must not be forgotten that the relief there
afforded was on the basis of free speech, not freedom of religion.
The impact of this constitutional principle on minority religious groups
was at one time quite severe in the area of public ceremonial observances, as
it still is in the area of police regulations. In general, however, its rigor has been
mitigated by the good sense of the legislative and administrative authorities,
who have seldom seen fit to override minority religious feelings to the full
extent constitutionally permissible. Thus, the substitution of Bible reading for
more specific religious teaching in the public schools; and the gradual watering-
down or elimination of Bible reading itself have come in most jurisdictions a
good deal in advance of the willingness of the courts to intervene on constitu-
tional grounds.75 Similarly, today such groups as pacifists and Christian Scientists
enjoy by legislation immunities from police regulation to which they have thus
far been given no constitutional claim.
It is this tendency to legislative and administrative accommodation that
71 HERSERG 97-98.
72 See note 62 sup ra.
73 Commonwealth ex rel. 'Wall v. Cooke, 7 Am. L. Reg. 417 (Mass. 1859) (quoted
at PFEFFER 377-78); Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 379 (1854); Church v. Bullock, 104
Tex. 1, 109 S.W. 115, 118 (1908) (Exclusion of "moral truths of the Bible" from school
instruction "would be to starve the moral and spiritual natures of the many out of deference
to the few."); Hackett v. Graded School Dist., 120 Ky. 608, 87 S.W. 792 (1905). The
court in Hackett made the interesting observation that the Catholic hierarchy has from
time to time opposed some of the political and scientific principles taught in the public
schools as vigorously as it opposed the King James Bible.
74 Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
75 PFEFFER 374-91; 2 STOXES 549-72.
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has brought about the result in Engel v. Vitale. The increased sensitivity to
minority rights that has been felt in recent years not just in the Supreme Court,
but throughout our society, has stepped up the tempo both of the development
of this kind of accommodation and of the continuing redefinition, already
referred to, of the consensus itself. Faced with this situation, the New York
Regents did exactly what many an English Parliament had done before them -
they gathered together all the elements represented in the consensus, and all
the elements that seemed entitled to accommodation at their hands, and ham-
mered out a compromise solution that would be acceptable to all, and yet
express the national consensus as best it might. Community pressures, both
legal and political, had left them so little maneuvering room that it seemed
impossible to find a permissible expression in any other way. So it did to the
English Parliaments of 1559 and 1662. Mr. Justice Black, in assimilating the
Regents' effort to those of the Anglican Fathers, had more in his favor than
his critics give him credit for.
III
The passing of the nonsectarian system I have been describing will not be
all loss to us. Its witness to our aspiration to fraternal union in our society, and
to our belief in the divine or more than societal origin of our free institutions
has not been without a price, and the price has been the attenuation of the
witness of organized religion to the fundamental human predicament and the
means whereby we may be saved from it. De Tocqueville had already noticed
the tendency of organized religion in America to take its lead from the national
consensus:
All American clergy know and respect the intellectual supremacy
exercised by the majority; they never sustain any but necessary
conflicts with it. They take no share in the altercations of parties,
but they readily adopt the general opinions of their country and
their age; and they allow themselves to be borne away without
opposition in the current of feeling and opinion by which every-
thing around them is carried along. They endeavor to amend their
contemporaries, but they never quit fellowship with them. Public
opinion is therefore never hostile to them; it rather supports and
protects them; and their belief owes its authority at the same time
to the strength which is its own, and to that which they borrow
from the opinion of the majority."
Herberg, writing in our own time, has discerned what seems to be basically the
same phenomenon, although he is a good deal more critical of it than is de
Tocqueville7
The working out of this orientation in the relation to American society of
any religious group included within the defining consensus tends to fall into
a definite pattern, whereby the commitments of the group are divided into three
categories.
The first such category is the set of commitments that the group shares
with the generality of society - opposition to juvenile delinquency, for example.
76 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA pt. II, bk. 1, ch. 5.
77 HERBERG, 94-97, 260-89, and passim.
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Commitments of this kind are relied on by the group in question to earn it the
respect, and sometimes the financial support, of the general community. 8
In a second category of commitments of a given religious group fall those
aspects of its teaching that it seeks to introduce into the scheme of values
accepted by the general community, sometimes by persuasion, sometimes by
political action. This seeking to influence the values of the general community
is quite apart from the desire of the group to spread its own membership. Thus
it is that certain religious groups are continually trying to keep all Americans
of whatever religion from drinking liquor;79 so the Catholic group is trying
to keep them from using contraceptives;" other churches pursue still other
objects in the same way.
Finally, there is a third category of commitment that a given religious
group holds as that which distinguishes it from the rest of the community-
its own peculiar doctrines and practices. These it makes no effort to impose
on the community in general, but will maintain for its own members even in
opposition to the community if it comes to that. This is the possibility that
de Tocqueville alludes to when he says that the clergy never sustain any but
necessary conflicts with the opinions of the majority. -Examples of beliefs and
practices peculiar in this way to particular religious groups are the Lutheran
doctrine of justification by faith alone, the Catholic rule of Sunday Mass attend-
ance, the pacifism of the Quakers, and the Baptist rejection of infant baptism.
In the context presented by our national consensus with its nonsectarian
expression, those aspects of a given group's commitment that fall into the first
of these three categories- that of commitments shared with the general com-
munity- tend to become central aspects, and in some measure to absorb the
others. This in turn leads the whole commitment of the group to take on a
good deal of the coloration imparted it by general community values, so that
the national consensus continually tends to take the center of the stage away
from the more religiously significant commitments that are peculiar to the
particular religious group. Let us consider briefly the mechanics of this tendency.
In the first place, the cases in which the values of the community coincide
with the commitments of this or that religious group tend in great part to come
to the fore as a result of initiative from the general community rather than
from the religious body."' This is quite natural, because the general community
78 As a random example, see the quote from J. Edgar Hoover, at 3 STOKES 107, begin-
ning "The churches are in the front trenches of America's crime prevention crusade!" A
number of arguments along these lines are assembled in PFEFFER 300-01. The most fully
articulated theory of the secular advantage of religion is perhaps WARBURTON, THE ALLIANCE
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE (1736). Warburton, beginning with a rigorous distinction
between the functions of church and state, proceeds to set up the entire English Establish-
ment on a basis of mutual advantage. Madison characterizes arguments of this kind as "an
unhallowed perversion of the means of salvation." Op. dit. supra note 31. For my own
part, I find this characterization hard to disagree with.
79 2 STOKES 328-44.
80 3 STOKES 67-78.
81 Marciniak, The Catholic Church and Labor, in THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, U.S.A. 255,
270 (Putz ed. 1956):
A 1954 study by a Benedictine monk of the attitude of industrial workers
in a Midwestern city revealed that while most of them supported the idea
of a living family wage, the necessity of labor unions, the social obligations
of private ownership, and so on, the source of these attitudes was not the
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is more sensitive to the over-all necessities of our society than is any one religious
group, and is more flexible in responding to them. Also, the general community
can bring more pressure to bear on the religious group than the religious group
can bring to bear on the general community. It would not be quite fair to say
that American churches have not discovered their religious commitments on
such issues as labor relations and racial equality until after the general com-
munity opinion had been formed. It seems entirely fair, however, to say that
the formation of the consciences of our major religious groups on these issues
has been concomitant with, and not in advance of, the formation of the general
community conscience. Certainly, no major church has authoritatively derived
from its theological commitments a position on these issues that had not already
commanded a good deal of public support. It is also significant that popular
religious pronouncements on these matters often display as much concern with
earning the good opinion of the workers or the Negroes, as the case may be,
as with following out the implications of revealed religion. 2
Turning next to the second category - that of values which a given religious
group would like to introduce among those of the general community, we find
that the group is continually led to state these values in terms calculated to
commend them to the general community, and therefore to play down their
connection with the underlying theological principles of the particular group.
This is apparent in many tracts of church origin concerning the evils of drink,
and in much Catholic propaganda on the subject of contraception or divorce. 3
Finally, when it comes to those beliefs and practices which are peculiar to
a given religious group, the necessity of commending the group itself to the
general community seems to lead to a description of these beliefs and practices
in terms of apologetics, rather than in terms of systematic theology.
The foregoing analysis may serve to explain the intellectual fuzziness of
which professional theologians are continually complaining in the current
American religious revival. It may also suggest the affinity of American non-
sectarianism for the English Erastianism that is its ideological ancestor - the
doctrine that rejects the rigorous duality of church and state in favor of a
unified religiously oriented society, whose religious orientation is the responsibil-
ity of its total institutional structure."4 Like Erastianism, American nonsectar-
Church - even though all of the men had attended a Catholic high school.
Their opinions on vital social and economic and international questions
were the result of exclusively secular influences, like the union, political
party and public opinion.
82 A particularly flagrant example is Marciniak, Catholics and Labor-Management
Relations, in THE AmERICAN APOSTOLATE 66 (Ward ed. 1952):
It shall not happen here. This is the determination that has sparked the
American Catholic social movement in industry. Europe's working classes
have left the Church in large numbers. Catholic leaders are determined
that this tragedy shall not happen on this side of the Atlantic.
Add to this determination a desire to right wrongs done to workers under
American capitalism, a periodic prodding of inactive Catholics by the
popes and the graceful action of the Holy Spirit, and you have an insight
into the dynamics of the Catholic social movement in the United States.
(Emphasis added.)
83 See, e.g., CONWAY, WHAT THEY Asx ABour MORALs 231-32 (1960).
84 The ideology I describe by the term Erastianism differs from the monism attacked
by Father Murray in his Are There Two or One?, in WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 197 (1960).
Erastianism does not conceive of an omnicompetent social order, still less of an omicom-
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ianism has the advantage of directing the whole institutional structure of society
toward the last end of man; like Erastianism, it has the disadvantage of putting
religion at the service of the world.
Erastian forms commend themselves in general to those for whom the
world is not such a bad place after all. English Erastianism was conceived in
the heady atmosphere of Tudor times, and perfected in the moribund com-
placency of the Georgian period. So American nonsectarianism was the product
of a people bemused with its own potential for secular achievement in the
development of a new land. To a generation more impressed with the ultimate
realities of the human condition - warfare, anxiety, loneliness, and death -
the view that all religions teach basically the same truths is not likely to com-
mend itself. Rather, it is the great questions of man's destiny and man's salvation
that become the basic ones, and it is on just these questions that different
religions give widely different answers.
IV
Herberg, commenting on Engel v. Vitale, points out what for him is crucial
in the current controversy over public religious expression - if we do not in
some way acknowledge the dependence of our free institutions on a divine
mandate, we place them in the realm of social expediency, ready to be altered
when our understanding of social expediency changes.8 5 I could add to his
concern another, based on the other aspect of the national consensus as I have
been describing it: if we remove every religious underpinning from our con-
ception of national unity, the goal of national unity will not continue to com-
mend itself to a people increasingly concerned with religious solutions to the
difficulties with which it is faced. As a matter of fact, however, we are still
very far from abandoning the religious foundation of our social and political
commitments. Rather, the problem presented us by the demise of the non-
sectarian system is one of accurately expressing and adequately institutionalizing
the defining national religious consensus we continue to feel we have.
For this problem I have no full-blown solution to offer; indeed, it is
probably too early for anyone to have one. It seems, however, that there are
two basic principles around which a solution can be constructed. These are
freedom and dialogue. To show that they will serve the purpose, it must be
shown, first, that they are in fact elements of our national consensus, second,
that they are religious elements, and, third, that we may give institutional
petent state, for it subjects the state and the entire social order to goals dictated by revealed
religion and not under the control of state or society. Nor is Erastian thought oblivious
to the essential duality introduced into political life by the intervention of the revealed
Word of God through the ministry of men. But for the Erastian that essential duality is
not between the institutional church and the institutional state, but rather between ecclesia
5fiscens and ecclesia docens, two aspects of the church - the one conceived as receiving divine
revelation, the other as promulgating it. The duality thus conceived is consistent with a
wide variety of institutional forms, and neither excludes nor requires a close integration
between ecclesia discens and the state.
85 13 NATIONAL Rav-Ww 145 (1962). Traditional natural law theories will not serve
the purpose, as they encompass both moral and juridical elements, and tend to impose no
limitation beyond that of expediency on the embodiment of moral principles in juridical
form. See Murray, Should There Be a Law?, in WE HoLD THESE TRUTHS 155 (1960).
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expression to them without infringing any recognized right of those who reject
them. Let us see if such a showing can be made.
Turning first to the question of freedom, it is scarcely necessary to demon-
strate that we have a national commitment that goes by that name. The serious
question is whether it is a religious commitment. There was certainly a religious
element in the early history of this commitment; 8 not only did the Founding
Fathers call upon God to validate their positions, they also included religious
considerations alongside social-contract philosophy among the serious arguments
they advanced. 7 Jefferson is particularly eloquent in this regard:
If the magistrate command me to bring my commodity to a
public store house I bring it because he can indemnify me if he
erred & I thereby lose it; but what indemnification can be given
one for the kingdom of heaven?
88
These arguments in their eighteenth-century form tend to look to a theology
of personal responsibility that not all Christians could accept; yet, the idea
that salvation cannot be imposed on a man from the outside would seem to
have a broader scope, and to comport with most theological systems.
The nonreligious bases which the Founding Fathers found for the principle
of freedom have not stood the test of time as well as the religious argument has.
These bases seem to have been, on an ideological level, the theory of the social
contract in one form or another, and, on a practical level, a well-founded belief
in the capacity of free individuals for realizing the potentialities of our country
for secular achievement. To see how our commitment to freedom is a religious
commitment, we must consider these alternative formulations of it, and what
has become of them.
First, the social contract theories of freedom have in common with religious
theories that they stem from a limitation on the competence of government.
Because of this common element, the two kinds of theories do not present a
particularly incongruous appearance when we find them side by side in the
works of the Founding Fathers. There is, however, an important distinction
between them in that the religious limitation on the powers of government
inheres in the nature of the case, whereas the social contract limitation is
artificial. In one case, we say that the government cannot constrain me in
matters of religion, because the reward of the religious man is salvation, and
the government does not have salvation in its gift. In the other case, we say
that the government cannot constrain me in matters of religion because no one
has empowered it to do so.
This social contract interpretation constituted a serious moral abdication
on the part of organized society, and began to be felt as such when its economic
implications began to pinch in the nineteenth century. The laissez faire inter-
pretations of freedom that prevailed in the Supreme Court in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries were the natural outgrowth of social contract
thinking in that they conceived of the social order as a mere regulation of the
inherent warfare between man and man over who was to impose his will on
86 1 STOKES 65-517 treats the early period exhaustively.
87 Madison, op. cit. supra note 31, presents a good example of this twofold approach.
88 Quoted at PFEFFER 94.
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a given portion of the material world. The rejection of laissez faire conceptions
entailed an interpretation of freedom as directed to a positive end, and as
capable of being afforded to all through the positive intervention of govern-
ment. 9 This meant a rather complete rejection of artificial limitations on
government in favor of limitations inherent in the nature 6f what government
was trying to accomplish.
Turning to th6 argument in favor of freedom as unlocking man's potential
for secular achievement, we find that this continues to be among the arguments
we advance in favor of freedom, but that the conviction with which we advance
it is generally sapped by a certain disillusionment as to the efficacy of secular
achievement. We, above all nations, are in a position to be aware that material
prosperity does not dull the edge of loneliness or existential anxiety, does not
mitigate the prospect of inevitable death. De Tocqueville discerned this aware-
ness in us when he contrasted our condition with that of the hierarchical societies
of Europe where the social order was an anodyne.9" We can find the same
awareness in ourselves when we contrast our condition today with that of the
newly developing societies abroad where the social order is conceived as a
panacea.9 We become, then, increasingly insistent that it is not enough to say
that freedom is good because it leads to secular achievement; we must show
what secular achievement leads to.
Increasingly, then, we have understood our commitment to freedom as a
recognition of a purpose in man that cannot be fulfilled through the means
under the control of organized society - a purpose that entails the organization
of society to leave man open to an enlightenment society cannot afford him.
Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel states a view which could probably command
a consensus of Americans in theory, despite our failure to live up to it in
practice, when he says that freedom is "openness to transcendence," and that
it is our responsibility to maintain "all these political, social and intellectual
conditions which will enable every man to bring about the concrete actualization
of freedom, which is the essential prerequisite of creative achievement."92
This view of freedom, therefore, fulfills the first two conditions I have
laid down for acceptance as a principle of the national religious consensus. It is
a religious view, and, as such, it is a national commitment. It also fulfili the
third of my conditions in that its embodiment in the constitutional doctrine
of the Supreme Court constitutes an institutional expression that is maintained
to the exclusion of the claims of those who hold other interpretations of freedom.
Thus, against those who hold for freedom as ancillary to social utility, the Court
says in Pierce v. Society of Sisters: "The, child is not the mere creature of the
89 See my Due Process and Social Legislation in the Supreme Court, 33 Noran- DAME
LAWYER 5 (1957).
90 DsmocRAcy IN AMERICA pt. II, b. 2, ch. 2, 13.
91 See Time, June 1, 1962, p. 48, reporting the findings of psychiatrist Viktor E. Franid
of the University of Vienna. Dr. Frankl defines a condition he calls "existential vacuum,"
which is the doubt that life has any meaning. In a survey of his own students, Dr. Frankl
found that this condition had been felt by 40% of the Germans, Swiss, and Austrians among
them, and by 81% of the Americans. He attributes this condition to industrialization, whereby
modem man is cut off both from animal instinct and from social tradition.
92 Heschel, The Religious Message, in RELIGION IN AMERICA 244, 260-61 (Cogley ed.
1958).
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State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.""
By the same token, those who hold that freedom is limited by morality and
those who hold that freedom imports the Absolute autonomy of the will are
alike refuted in the doctrine of the Court on the subject of free speech. Thus
it is that of two passages offending alike against prevailing principles of sexual
morality, one will be protected because it represents an effort at genuine literary
communication, whereas the other may be suppressed because it represents no
more than an appeal to prurient interest for the sake of financial gain.94 Thus
also, we may litter the streets with handbills extolling the most dangerous and
immoral of philosophies, but not with handbills extolling the most innocuous
of soaps.9" In short, we do not limit a man's freedom to what is moral or
socially expedient, nor do we extend it to whatever he wishes to do. If he seeks
a goal within the gift of society, he must seek it along the lines society has laid
down. But the reaching out to some elusive immortality, some mysterious com-
munion with God or man - these society cannot give, and these society cannot
take away.
Freedom, then, in our society, is an element of a national religious con-
sensus in that it is conceived of as imposing on the efforts of organized society
a limitation and a direction, both of which are derived from an essential insight
into the spiritual nature of man. This essential insight is in some sense a religious
one. It is at the same time one our society continues to maintain against anyone
who would alter the direction or transcend the limitation society derives from it.
This brings us to the second element I have proposed for a national
religious consensus - dialogue. The term "dialogue" as applied to the subject
of religion refers to conversation among persons of different beliefs, having for
its purpose mutual understanding and respect, rather than agreement. To this
end, it stresses personal affirmation, and eschews both apologetics and com-
promise. It is not hard to show that dialogue as thus understood is a religious
commitment. Its development is largely the work of theologians, perhaps the
most influential among them being Martin Buber.96 Also, its underlying pre-
suppositions seem to be religious. Its aspiration to personal rapport among
persons of different religions is born of the recognition of a common spiritual
nature and a common spiritual predicament. Its hope for such rapport lies in
the recognition that God is a Person. Unity among those who seek Him lies
93 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925). (Emphasis added.)
94 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). This case is significant in that judge
Frank, in a concurring opinion below, had invited the Supreme Court to apply to material
appealing to prurient interest the same clear and present danger test applied to material
appealing to any other interest. United States v. Roth, 237 F.2d 796, 801 (2d Cir. 1956).
95 Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). The holding in this case that com-
mercial advertising was not protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech seems
to have commanded general acceptance, although the Supreme Court advanced neither
reason nor authority to support it. The majority opinion below did no better. 122 F.2d 511(2d
Cir. 1941). The only attempt at a rationale was made by Judge Frank, dissenting below. 122
F.2d at 517. He based a preference for the ideological over the commercial on the requirements
of communication in a democracy - which seems inconsistent with his position in Roth. But
the democratic communication rationale will not cover all the interests presently given higher
constitutional protection than is given to commercial advertising.
96 For a selection of Buber's works along these lines, see FOUR EXISTENTALIST THEO-
LOGIANS 155-229 (Herberg ed. 1958).
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not in describing Him, but in finding Him - not in reducing theological
formulations to their lowest common denominator, but in pursuing every such
formulation to the deepest knowledge of Him that it is capable of yielding."
Dialogue, then, is a religious commitment. Is it a national commitment?
Here the question is more difficult, but there is ground for saying that, at least
implicitly, it is. In the first place, dialogue is founded on respect for conviction,
and respect for conviction is among Americans a rather ingrained habit. If we
were to set down the definition of dialogue as given above: "conversation among
persons of different beliefs, having for its object mutual understanding and
respect, rather than agreement," and poll a representative sample of Americans
as to whether they approved of it, can there be any doubt as to the result?
Furthermore, dialogue has the same end of fraternal union that was served
by the nonsectarian system with its "common core" approach. As the demise
of that system becomes increasingly apparent, it seems likely that those who
continue to value the aspiration to fraternal union will turn increasingly to
dialogue, as the theologians have already done.
It is, then, as the successor to the nonsectarian tradition that I believe
dialogue will take its place as a national commitment. To make this point, it
is necessary to consider once more the claims of the two alternatives discussed
above - secularism and religious pluralism - that have played in general a
role of opposition during the ascendancy of nonsectarianism. Of these, secular-
ism will be in no position to make a bid for acceptance as a national commit-
ment unless it can overcome the disillusionment I have already described with
the importance of secular achievement. The seri6us bid for acceptance is the
one that will be made by religious pluralism.
As we have seen, the most telling objection to religious pluralism is that
it is "divisive" - i.e., that it is inconsistent with our national aspiration to
fraternal union. The version of religious pluralism that comes nearest to meeting
this objection is that ably structured by Father John Courtney Murray.9 8 Father
Murray has a place in his system for each of the four great traditions in American
life - Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism and secular humanism - and to
govern relations among them he offers substitutes for the aspiration to fraternal
union and for religious dialogue as I have been describing it. These substitutes
are respectively civic amity and civic dialogue:
Hence the climate of the City is . . . distinctive. It is not feral
or familial but forensic. It is not hot and humid, like the climate
of the animal kingdom. It lacks the cordial warmth of love and
unreasoning loyalty that pervades the family. It is cool and dry,
with the coolness, and dryness that characterize good argument
among informed and responsible men.99
Father Murray tends here, as he does generally, to see in American institutions
a rational tradition where others, including myself, would see a religious tradi-
97 SKYDSGARD, ONE IN CHRIST ch. 1 (1957); E INHErr IN CHRISTUS passim (Cullmann
and Karrer ed. 1960). These deal with dialogue between Protestants and Catholics, and
therefore stress the Person of Christ. But the Person of God the Father commands the
adherence of Christians and Jews alike.
98 The Civilization of the Pluralist Society, in WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS 5 (1960).
99 Id. at 7.
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tion.' While I am not prepared to offer a full-dress critique of Father Murray's
approach, I do not think reason is capable of the task he sets it.'' My own
experience of the climate of the City is that it is not forensic but familial. Its
discord is that of relatives throwing the family china at one another, and its
concord is that of persons living together intimately -a concord based on a
habit of reverence before the awful and impenetrable mystery of another human
being. This habit of reverence may come from instinct, or it may come from
revelation. I do not think it can come from reason. 2 In short, as against
fraternal union and religious dialogue, Father Murray's substitute seems entirely
too cool and dry to prevail.'
While the claim of religious dialogue to acceptance as a religious element
in our national consensus shows every likelihood of prevailing in the long run,
it has not yet been fully embodied in our institutional structure. Thus, only a
tentative showing can be made that religious dialogue fulfills the third of the
conditions I have laid down - that it can be given institutional expression with-
out infringing the rights of those who object to it. I find such a tentative
showing in the increasing reliance on dialogue in the more sophisticated of the
arguments being put forward in support of the unitary public school system
and the continuing denial of public funds for alternative educational efforts.' 0
These arguments presuppose that the aim of the parochial school system is to
withdraw Catholic students from dialogue with Americans of other religions;
until the proponents of that system are able to meet this presupposition head-on,
it is most unlikely that they will get a favorable hearing outside their own ranks
for their claims to public support. To this extent, our commitment to dialogue
may be expected to impinge coercively on the proponents of religious pluralism.
By the same token, it seems not unlikely that a true dialogic pattern of religious
practices in the public schools, if it could be developed, would be sustained
against secularist objections.' 5
100 This seems also to be GABRIEL'S interpretation of the American consensus, which he
characterizes over and over again as the democratic faith.
101 Murray seems aware of the difficulty of persuading Americans that they have a con-
sensus based on reason. Two Cases For the Public Consensus, in WE HOLD THESE TRUTHS
79 (1960).
102 Murray seems to include both the sovereignty of God and the sacredness of man
among the elements of the rational consensus he discerns. In view of the widespread rejection
of natural theology among contemporary non-Catholic theologians, this seems an unwarranted
imposition of Catholic thought patterns on the American consensus. A survey taken a few
years ago reports that 83% of Americans believe the Bible to be the revealed word of God.
Catholic Digest, May 1954, p. 21. Do anything like that number believe in natural theology?
103 It is perhaps symbolic that at the very gathering keynoted by the paper from which
the above words are quoted, a gathering at which informed and responsible men had been
assembled for just the purposes Father Murray describes, the subsequent meetings were
neither cool nor dry. Rather, according to James O'Gara, writing shortly after the event,
they passed from a stage of subsurface "suspicion, hostility, aggression" which gave rise
to "an acrimonious debate" to a stage of religious dialogue in which "Christian spirit spoke
to Christian spirit." 68 COMMONWEAL 227-29 (1958).
104 See Nichols, Religion and Education in a Free Society, in RELIGION IN AMERICA 148
(Cogley ed. 1958).
105 See Kahn, 77 COMMONWAL 257, 258 (1962):
The Court has by no means declared itself concerning the validity of spon-
taneous and voluntary religious activities within public institutions. Granted
that judicial clarification concerning the manner in which such spon-
taneous activities can legitimately occur may be reserved for the future,
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To sum up, the value of freedom and dialogue as the root principles in
our national religious consensus lies in their conformity on the one hand to
what is deepest and truest in our traditional aspirations as a people, and on
the other hand to a recognition of those central mysteries of human existence
to which the most important of religious affirmations are addressed.
It would be comforting to be able to derive from this formulation of
principles some consequences of practical application to the church-state prob-
lems currently faciig our schools and our society. But I see these principles less
as furnishing a logical basis for solving problems of this kind than as conducing
to an atmosphere in which they may be solved. The profoundest consequence
of a national religious consensus worked out in terms of freedom and dialogue
is that it becomes the concern of every citizen that every other citizen live out
his own deepest commitments to the fullest possible extent. It is in the context
of heightened spiritual awareness afforded by such a living out that we await
the manifestation of divine power whereby freedom may be consummated in
salvation, dialogue in unity. And it is in this concern for such a living out
that we may hope for a solution to our immediate problems of church and state.
there is no indication that inroads have been made on the religious tradi-
tion that is inseparably linked with the democratic ideal.
What is more likely is that the future will call for new forms of
expression of this tradition which will safeguard the basic principle of
public acknowledgment of religion while purifying itself of the remnants
of de facto establishment in which this tradition has been previously
embodied. Concretely, it is conceivable that the public schools could
declare various and limited holidays throughout the year, in which the
principal denominations in their own symbolic and esthetic forms express
the spirit of devotion that permeates their lives. Even the agnostic humanist
may have his day. It is not unthinkable that, with the growth of tolerance,
Jewish and Christian students may recognize interiorally that even here
an unknown God receives due praise.
It is also possible that what Murray proposes for the University, Creeds at War Intelligibly,
in WE HoLD THEsE TRUTHls 25 (1960), could be adapted in some form for the schools.
